Abstract
Introduction
The growing signifi cance of trade in services has led to rigorous multilateral efforts to realize the progressive abolition of barriers to trade in services. 1 The fi nal text of the This article aims to address the challenge that Members face in the fulfi lment of the Article VI(4) legal mandate in the current negotiating round. An indispensable part of this mandate is the creation of a meaningful, coherent, and enforceable horizontal necessity test that would be fl exible enough to cope with the extensive sectoral diversity in services. The function of such a test is to validate the GATS consistency of a measure relating to qualifi cations, licensing, and technical standards provided that it is not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfi l a Member's objectives. The article is based on the premise that Members cannot completely fulfi l the mandate of Article VI(4) unless they agree on a necessity test for such measures. Additionally, it is argued that any disciplines that may be developed under Article VI(4) will have no value without some kind of necessity test, since necessity is a key proxy for drawing the line between legitimate regulatory interference and protectionism.
Section 2 addresses the objective function of Article VI. Section 3 is dedicated to a review of the most signifi cant necessity tests in the WTO Agreements and the corresponding case law to date. The role of necessity tests (or tests of similar content like the EC proportionality test) in Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) will be discussed in Section 4. Drawing on the legal drafting dealing with necessity in other WTO Agreements, the germane WTO case law, and various elements of regional experience, Section 5 identifi es elements and concepts that could be relevant in creating an effective horizontal necessity test. Section 6 examines the proposals advanced to date in the WPDR regarding the creation of a horizontal necessity test and identifi es common elements and tendencies. Finally, various concerns that may prolong negotiations 8 or prevent Members from seeking stronger discipline in the area of domestic regulation for all services sectors are discussed in Section 7.
The Contours of Article VI(4)
More than any other GATS provision, Article VI touches on the interface of services trade liberalization and domestic policy autonomy. Article VI(4) is aimed at measures that do not discriminate (either de jure or de facto ) against foreign services or foreign service suppliers, and hence are not captured by Article XVII GATS. Furthermore, such measures are of a qualitative nature, as they typically strive to ensure the quality of the service supplied, and thus avoid falling under the six categories of limitations in Article XVI(2) GATS. A further attribute of Article VI(4) measures is that they entail, for the most part, minimum requirements. For instance, domestic measures that lay down the minimum requirements that a service supplier must fulfi l in order to be eligible, under domestic law, to obtain a licence come under this provision. Oddly enough, the aforementioned attributes of this provision are not drawn from the GATS text, but were spelled out for the fi rst time in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines 9 and reiterated 8 Of course, delays in the services negotiations can also be the result of Members ' failure to reach agreement in other negotiations areas such as agriculture.
in the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines. 10 Importantly, as illustrated by the US -Gambling dispute, the knotty interplay between Articles VI, XVI, XVII, and XVIII GATS can be clarifi ed only with reference to the Guidelines. 11 Hence, in the aftermath of this dispute, the Guidelines ended up as an indispensable interpretative instrument of the GATS and the obligations laid down therein.
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The US -Gambling ruling deserves further reference at this point because it shed some light on the distinction between quantitative and qualitative measures under GATS. Several scholars criticized the ruling on the basis that it failed to recognize the qualitative and legitimate nature of the measures at issue when it declared their inconsistency with Article XVI GATS. 13 Nevertheless, it is argued that measures establishing a total prohibition on the supply of a given service for which a full commitment was undertaken cannot be considered as ensuring the quality of this service. In this case, the prohibition on the supply of internet gambling did indeed aim to protect minors, prevent fraud, or maintain public order, etc., and these legitimate objectives were correctly addressed in the ruling under Article XIV GATS.
14 In sum, the USGambling ruling did not blur the distinction between qualitative and quantitative measures under GATS, but instead contributed to its elucidation.
Article VI contains principally obligations of a procedural nature. 15 Its substantive obligation is to be found in paragraph (4), which provides the negotiating framework and the basic principles that Members have to transform into disciplines. 16 More precisely, the legal mandate contained in this provision seeks to guarantee that measures relating to licensing, qualifi cations, and technical standards are, inter alia , (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; and (c) with respect to licensing procedures not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service. Thus, these criteria constitute an indicative list of minimum characteristics that the prospective regulatory disciplines should exhibit. Of course, Members are free to introduce additional features into the disciplines, e.g., the reasonableness of 14 In extenso see Delimatsis, supra note 11 . 15 See also Delimatsis, ' Due Process and " Good " Regulation Embedded in the GATS -Disciplining Regulatory Behaviour in Services through Article VI of the GATS ' , 1 JIEL (2007) 13, at 19. licence fees or the independence of the supervisory authority. It follows that this provision provides for a positive-integration-type obligation to the extent that Members enter into multilateral negotiations with a view to agreeing on the minimum requirements that their own regulatory framework on qualifi cations, licensing, and technical standards must fulfi l. In the medium to long run, such multilateral disciplines will bring about regulatory reform at the domestic level and induce regulatory co-operation. In all likelihood, minimum harmonization and mutual recognition of domestic regulations would follow. 17 Until the work programme of Article VI(4) is brought to fruition, Article VI(5) provides for the application of the main principles laid down in paragraph (4) to licensing, qualifi cation, and technical standards, so that no domestic regulatory measure leads to nullifi cation or impairment of a Member's commitments in a manner not anticipated by its trading partners. 18 The substantive, ' standstill ' obligation of paragraph (5) is transitory and applies only to sectors where specifi c commitments are made. 19 It follows that, while this paragraph includes a provisional necessity test, a successful invocation of this provision by a Member is made practically impossible through the use of concepts such as ' nullifi cation or impairment ' and ' reasonable expectations ' . 20 Article VI(4) takes in solely domestic regulatory measures relating to qualifi cation requirements and procedures (QRP), licensing requirements and procedures (LRP), and technical standards (TS). 21 All the same, these categories of measures include a vast array of domestic regulations. 22 Qualifi cation requirements include substantive requirements that a service supplier has to fulfi l in order to obtain certifi cation or a licence, such as examination, experience, or language requirements. Qualifi cation procedures are administrative or procedural rules for administering the qualifi cation requirements, such as the number and nature of documents to be fi led or the fees to be paid. Licensing requirements include all substantive requirements that do not fall into the category of qualifi cation requirements, compliance with which would allow a service supplier to obtain formal permission to supply a service. Any registration or establishment requirements are examples of this category of measures. As to the licensing procedures, these are administrative procedures dealing with the submission and 17 Art. VI(4) is expected to level the playing fi eld in the areas that it covers and hence facilitate recognition. This is also implied in Art. VII GATS, which is linked to Art. VI(4) and provides a means for recognition in the areas of licensing, authorization, and certifi cation of service suppliers. For a thorough analysis of Art. VI(5) see Delimatsis, supra note 15, at 39 -45. 21 The draft provision included in the ' Dunkel Draft ' was broader, but Members considered it too farreaching: GATT, ' Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations ' , MTN.TNC/W/FA, 1991; see also WTO (CTS), ' Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Applicable to All Services ' , S/C/W/96, 1999, at paras 2 -3; Reyna, ' Services ' , in T. Stewart (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986 -1992) (1993) , ii, at 2429. processing of an application for a licence, such as the number and nature of documents required or time frames for licence processing. Finally, technical standards include requirements which can be related to the characteristics or the defi nition of the service itself, as well as to the manner in which the service is performed. For example, a code of conduct for lawyers would fall into this category. Arguably, voluntary standards (that is, standards compliance with which is optional) also come into this category. 23 Furthermore, Article VI embraces not only QRP, LRP, and TS, but also measures relating thereto, implying a wide scope. 24 By the same token, the implications of the prospective disciplines for potential service suppliers through mode 4 can be substantial. The current ubiquity of non-discriminatory, but still onerous and vague requirements and procedures negatively affecting individuals when they attempt to supply their services acts as a deterrent to the potential suppliers. As the possibility of unilateral action in these areas is inherently limited, all Members, and especially those that are interested in effective liberalization under mode 4, should make every effort to ensure that these negotiations are a success.
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Necessity Tests in Other WTO Agreements
Necessity tests in WTO law are used as tools for assessing the compatibility with the WTO of otherwise trade-restrictive national measures. Such measures can be deemed WTO-consistent on condition that they are necessary to attain a legitimate objective or a given level of protection domestically. De lege lata , necessity can be referred to in a WTO provision that entails either an obligation or an exception . 26 It bears noting that necessity was conceptualized as part of substantive obligations relating to trade in goods (e.g., TBT, SPS) only after the creation of the WTO. Necessity existed in the GATT years only in the form of an affi rmative defence in Article XX GATT mainly to allow the Contracting Parties to deviate from the overarching principle of nondiscrimination in order to pursue legitimate objectives such as the protection of health or the preservation of natural resources. In the Uruguay Round, however, the participating countries identifi ed the need for including in the TBT and SPS a substantive obligation which would ensure that market access gained through negotiations was not jeopardized by the existence of unnecessary obstacles to trade in goods.
Necessity in obligation provisions is to be found in Articles VI(4), and (5), and XII(2)(d) GATS; 2(2), (3), and (5) TBT; 2(2) and 5(6) SPS; and 8(1) TRIPs. Paragraph (2) of the draft accountancy disciplines also falls into this category. Provisions that comprise necessity as part of an exception include: Article XIV GATS and paragraph 23 Ibid ., at para. 6. 24 Again, a wide range of regulatory measures fall outside the scope of Art. VI(4), such as the independence of the regulatory authority or universal service provisions, business advertising, and marketing, access to networks and essential facilities. (5)(e) of the Annex on Telecommunications; Articles XI(2)(b) and (c), and XX GATT; Articles 3(2) and 27(2) TRIPs; and Article 23(2) GPA. The provisions entailing an exception could be further refi ned into provisions that are part of an exception to the provisions where they belong (e.g., Article XI(2)(b) GATT or paragraph (5)(e) of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications), and provisions that constitute a general exception (e.g., Article XX GATT or XIV GATS).
In provisions containing an obligation, necessity is usually coupled with an indicative list of objectives, whereas the exception provisions embody an exhaustive list of policy objectives. The issue whether the necessity standard is part of a provision containing an exception or, rather, an obligation is decisive for the allocation of the burden of proof. Thus, the responding party has to establish that a measure is necessary when it invokes an exception provision. In contrast, in the case of an obligation provision, it is the complaining party that has to adduce evidence that a measure does not meet the necessity standard. Since this article's intention is to draw lessons from the application and interpretation of necessity in other WTO Agreements, the analysis that follows will be confi ned to necessity tests embodied in WTO provisions that the WTO judiciary has ruled on, i.e., Article XX GATT; Article XIV GATS, and paragraph (5)(e) of the Annex on Telecommunications; Article 2(2) TBT; and Article 5(6) SPS.
A Article XX GATT
Article XX GATT was the fi rst provision under which the Panels and the Appellate Body (AB) interpreted necessity. This provision embodies an exhaustive list of general exceptions to GATT substantive obligations and establishes a two-tier test 27 in which it is necessary to determine whether the challenged measure comes within the scope of one of subparagraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX before examining whether the measure satisfi es the requirements of the Article XX chapeau . 28 The responding party has to demonstrate that this measure addresses (or is designed to address 29 ) the particular interest identifi ed in the relevant paragraph, and that there is a suffi cient nexus between the measure and the interest protected. 30 Once it has demonstrated that the measure is provisionally justifi ed, the responding party should additionally show that, when applied, the challenged measure is not an abuse of an exception under the chapeau .
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As early as in the GATT era it was made clear that the legitimacy of the ends sought is not a matter for WTO scrutiny. Rather, the Panels were charged with examining whether the means chosen to achieve one of the objectives laid down 27 Appellate Body Report, US -Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, at 3, 22; also Appellate Body Report, US -Shrimp , supra note 5, at paras 119 -120, and 147; and Appellate Body Report, US -Gambling , supra note 12, at para. 292.
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Appellate Body Report, US -Shrimp , supra note 5, at paras 157 and 119. 29 Appellate Body Report, Mexico -Soft Drinks , WT/DS308/AB/R, at para. 72.
30
Appellate Body Report, US -Gasoline , supra note 27, at 17 -18; also Appellate Body Report, USGambling , supra note 12, at para. 292.
31
Appellate Body Report, US -Gasoline , supra note 27, at 22 -23. The requirements of the chapeau fall outside the scope of this study.
in Article XX were ' necessary ' . 32 Neither is the level of attainment (or protection) something in which the WTO has a say. 33 Unilaterally defi ned measures can be WTOconsistent and, therefore, Article XX cannot be deemed to curtail regulatory diversity. 34 The The willingness of the adjudicating bodies to interpret necessity in a uniform manner was apparent in the GATT years. The Thailand -Cigarettes Panel, for instance, ruled that the term ' necessary ' should be regarded as having the same meaning in paragraphs (b) and (d) of Article XX. 36 Another proposition that appears valid after examining the GATT case law is that a WTO Member is not obliged to use GATTconsistent measures for achieving its policy objectives unless there is a reasonably available GATT-consistent measure that could attain the same objective.
Korea -Beef is the leading case dealing with the interpretation of the concept of necessity in the WTO years so far. In interpreting necessity in Article XX(d), the AB acknowledged that it implies a ' range of degrees of necessity ' . 37 On the one hand, this means that, if a measure is indispensable, its necessity cannot be challenged. On the other hand, if other measures are reasonably available and thus the challenged measure is not indispensable, the latter can still be deemed ' necessary ' . 38 To determine this, the WTO judiciary will apply a necessity test which amounts to a process of ' weighing and balancing a series of factors ' : 39 which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue [the greater the contribution, the more easily a measure might be considered to be ' necessary ' ], the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation [the more vital or important these common interests or 32 For instance, GATT Panel Report, Japan -Alcoholic Beverages I , BISD 34S/83, at para. This weighing and balancing process was regarded as being 40 ' comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent alternative measure which the Member concerned could " reasonably be expected to employ " is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is " reasonably available " ' .
The signifi cance of the Korea -Beef jurisprudence lies in the following elements and clarifi cations:
(a) The AB gave effect to the GATT case law by identifying precise criteria which could assist in determining the necessity of a given measure; (b) Although this list of criteria is not exhaustive, subsequent case law suggests that these criteria dominate in the WTO judiciary's examination of necessity.
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(c) Necessity cannot be determined in abstracto ; instead, a comparison between the challenged measure and alternative options that may achieve the same level of protection must be undertaken. 42 Only thus can the adjudicating bodies evaluate the reasonable availability of an alternative measure, based on the ' weighing and balancing ' process. (d) Depending on the importance of the interests at issue, the WTO adjudicating bodies will apply differing levels of scrutiny. 43 Indeed, in cases where the objective is of vital importance, the standard of review is very deferential, as the values at stake weigh more in the eyes of the AB. (f) Finally, in Korea -Beef , the AB refi ned the least -trade-restrictiveness element which originated in US -Section 337 through the adoption of an approach that seeks the identifi cation of a less trade-restrictive measure through a sort of proportionality, means -ends (or ' weighing and balancing ' ) test. 46 Arguably, there has been a shift in the post-UR jurisprudence vis-à-vis the GATT era towards favouring regulatory diversity and unilaterally defi ned policy choice more than was the case in the pre-UR years, 47 especially when comparing the USShrimp case law with the Tuna/Dolphin GATT jurisprudence. Then, depending on the circumstances and the interests at stake, in the WTO jurisprudence a second-best measure can still satisfy the Article XX necessity test, something that would not have been warranted under the earlier US -Section 337 GATT jurisprudence.
In Mexico -Soft Drinks , the AB adopted an even less intrusive approach by stating that the necessity requirement under Article XX(d) can be satisfi ed even if the design of a measure contributes to securing compliance with domestic laws or regulations, but its effi cacy remains uncertain . 48 Thus, a measure that is capable or suitable for the achievement of the objective sought without any guaranteed results can meet the necessity standard.
More recently, in Brazil -Retreaded Tyres , this regulator-friendly approach was called into question. In this case, the AB was called upon to clarify the process of ' weighing and balancing ' the relevant factors. The AB was more systematic in its reasoning than in previous cases. It suggested that this process entails two stages: in the fi rst stage, a Panel has to examine the contribution of the measure at issue to the achievement of the objective sought against its trade restrictiveness and in the light of the interests at stake; in the second stage, the Panel must compare the measure at issue with any possible alternatives identifi ed by the complaining Member. 49 From the factors that need to be ' weighed and balanced ' , the AB shed light in this dispute on the requirement that a measure contribute to the achievement of the objective pursued. The AB emphasized that this requirement is fulfi lled when there is a ' genuine relationship ' of means and ends between the goal sought and the challenged measure. However, according to the AB, the standard of review should be more stringent when the chosen measure is the most trade-restrictive possible. In this case, a total prohibition on imports cannot satisfy the necessity standard unless its contribution to the achievement of the goal sought is ' material ' , rather than marginal or insignifi cant. Whether this is the case will be judged on a case-by-case basis, depending on many elements such as the nature of the risk, the objective sought, the level of protection, as well as the evidence before the 46 The AB never excluded the possibility of using in its Art. XX judicial review elements contained in a proportionality test: Appellate Body Report, US -Shrimp , supra note 5, at para. 141.
Determining the Necessity of Domestic Regulations in Services
Panel. 50 The extent of the contribution by the challenged measure to the goal sought can be assessed either quantitatively or qualitatively. 51 Accordingly, the AB pointed again to the importance of balancing and suggested that the more trade-restrictive a measure is, the more diffi cult it is for it to be regarded as ' necessary ' . Indeed, in an amplifi cation of its statement in paragraph 163 of the Korea -Beef dispute, the AB implied that a marginal or insignifi cant contribution to the objective pursued by a measure that is as trade-restrictive as an import prohibition, e.g., a marginal reduction of the risks carried, can result in a failure to meet the necessity standard even in the absence of reasonable alternatives to the challenged measure. 52 Finally, the AB's stance vis-à-vis the Panel's analysis confi rms the considerable margin of appreciation that Panels enjoy when they review such measures against the requirements of Article XX GATT. The AB made this clear by underscoring that ' [t]he weighing and balancing is a holistic operation that involves putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating them in relation to each other after having examined them individually, in order to reach an overall judgement ' .
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The WTO adjudicating bodies also spelled out the concept of reasonable availability. First the US -Gasoline Panel indicated that an alternative measure can still be deemed reasonably available even in the presence of administrative diffi culties. 54 The AB tackled the issue in EC -Asbestos and clarifi ed that the diffi culty of implementation, as well as other factors associated with administrative burden, such as cost, technical diffi culties, and lack of expertise, can render a measure reasonably unavailable . 55 Recently, in Dominican Republic -Cigarettes , the AB widened the list of factors that make a measure reasonably unavailable. In so doing, the AB deemed relevant to the goods context similar fi ndings made in the services realm, and hence stated that a measure is to be regarded as not being reasonably available 56 where it is merely theoretical in nature, for instance, where the responding Member is not capable of taking it, or where the measure imposes an undue burden on that Member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical diffi culties … In Brazil -Retreaded Tyres , the AB confi rmed this case law 57 and elaborated on the reasonable availability of an alternative measure by noting that a total ban on imports may be preferable under certain circumstances. Notably, this can be the case when 50 Ibid ., at paras 145, 151, and 210.
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Ibid ., at paras 146 and 151.
52
Ibid ., at para. 150. However, the AB qualifi ed this statement in para. 151 of the Report. Furthermore, the AB appears to weaken its approach even further later on by insinuating that it would suffi ce if the measure at issue were likely to bring a material contribution: ibid ., at para. 155.
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Ibid ., at para. 182; also para. 145 (highlighting that this margin of appreciation has its limits). the proposed alternatives are particularly costly and/or require advanced technologies and know-how that may not be available to the regulating Member. 58 In such cases an import ban would have the advantage that it is easy to implement and does not require any substantial costs for its implementation. 59 The reasonable availability of a proposed alternative can also be compromised by the fact that its implementation carries considerable risks. 60 Thus, alternative measures associated with considerable administrative burden and excessive costs will be deemed reasonably unavailable , even if they achieve the Member's desired level of protection at lesser trade cost. However, the mere fact that an alternative measure is more diffi cult or more expensive to implement does not render it ipso facto reasonably unavailable. 61 Rather, the reasonable availability of a measure will be determined on a case-by-case basis, the ultimate standard of review being whether the alternative measure can achieve the desired objectives equally as effectively as the challenged measure.
B Article XIV GATS and paragraph 5(e) of the Annex on Telecommunications
The general exception clause of the GATS largely replicates its GATT counterpart, Article XX. 62 Article XIV allows a deviation from any GATS provision and hence Members are free to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures for predefi ned purposes and subject to the specifi c requirements of Article XIV. In addition, Article XIV(d) and (e) allows for a deviation from specifi c GATS provisions. Furthermore, Article XIV establishes three necessity tests the objectives of which are identical to those embodied in Article XX GATT. 63 Because of the analogies between the two provisions, the case law under Article XX GATT can be instructive in any analysis under Article XIV GATS.
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The US -Gambling case was not only the fi rst in which the AB addressed Article XIV, but also the fi rst under any of the WTO Agreements where the AB was called upon to interpret the public morals exception. 65 The AB started its analysis by emphasizing 58 Or, even if this know-how is available, the cost of implementation on a large scale is prohibitive: ibid ., at paras 175 and 211.
59
Ibid ., at para. 171.
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Ibid ., at para. 174; also Appellate Body Report, EC -Asbestos , supra note 33, at para. 174. 61 See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, Korea -Beef , supra note 33, at paras 180 -181. These necessity tests refl ect ' the shared understanding of Members that substantive GATS obligations should not be deviated from lightly ' : Appellate Body Report, US -Gambling , supra note 12, at para. 308.
64
Ibid ., at para. 291; see also Appellate Body Report, EC -Bananas III , WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, 591, at para. 231 (where the AB encouraged Panels that deal with the interpretation of GATS provisions to refer to the GATT only where the obligations are essentially of the same type). See also Appellate Body Report, EC -Sardines , WT/DS231/AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, 3359, at para. 275 (where the AB criticizes the Panel because it failed to deploy a principle articulated under the SPS Agreement on the burden of proof in the TBT context, although there were conceptual similarities between the provisions in the two Agreements).
that necessity entails an objective standard. Consequently, the task of the Panels, when interpreting a measure, is, based on the evidence proffered, ' independently and objectively [to] assess the " necessity " of the measure before it ' . 66 Based on Korea -Beef and EC -Asbestos , the AB clarifi ed that ' a comparison between the challenged measure and possible alternatives should be undertaken, and the results of such comparison should be considered in the light of the importance of the interests at issue ' . 67 In this respect, the AB made an important contribution regarding the burden of proof. More specifi cally, while it is well-known that the responding party bears the burden of proving that the challenged measure falls within the ambit of Article XIV, the AB pointed out that the respondent should not be expected to identify the ' universe of less trade-restrictive alternative measures ' , and hence to establish that the objective sought can be attained only through the challenged measure. Such a task would be an ' impracticable and often impossible burden ' , according to the AB. 68 Rather, Article XIV requires that the responding party establish a presumption that the measure is necessary, in accordance with various factors, including the ' relative importance ' of the interests furthered by the challenged measure, the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it, and the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce, as identifi ed in the Korea -Beef case. Then, it is incumbent upon the complainant to demonstrate that concrete, reasonably available, WTO-compatible (or less WTO-incompatible) alternative measures exist. 69 In this case, the responding party's task is to show that the challenged measure is still necessary, or that the proposed alternative measure is not reasonably available, or that it cannot achieve the same level of protection or attain the objective pursued.
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In US -Gambling , the AB reversed the Panel's fi nding that engaging in consultations with Antigua in order to resolve their differences was a reasonably available alternative measure for the United States. Such a measure would not stand comparison with the challenged measure, as it entails a process with uncertain results. 71 Importantly, the Mexico -Soft Drinks Panel, when interpreting Article XX(d) GATT, attempted to transpose this interpretation made under Article XIV(a) GATS to the GATT context, and accordingly ruled that 72 measures that are of uncertain outcome do not qualify as reasonably available alternatives when considering whether a measure is necessary to secure compliance with a law or regulation. Following a similar rationale, in order to qualify as a measure ' to secure compliance ' , it would seem that there should be a degree of certainty in the results that may be achieved through the measure.
66
Appellate Body Report, US -Gambling , supra note 12, at para. 304.
67
Ibid ., at para. 307.
68
Ibid ., at para. 309. Cf. Appellate Body Report, Japan -Agricultural Products II , WT/DS76/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, 277, at para. 137.
69
Ibid., at para. 126.
70
Appellate Body Report, US -Gambling , supra note 12, at paras 309 -311.
71
Ibid ., at para. 317.
72
Panel Report, Mexico -Soft Drinks , WT/DS308/R, at para. 8.188.
The AB, however, reversed this fi nding by stating that, fi rst, it was improper to apply to the case at stake an interpretation made in another context which was irrelevant to the terms ' to secure compliance ' , and, secondly, the measure at issue need not be designed to guarantee the achievement of the objective pursued ( in casu , securing compliance with domestic laws and regulations) ' with absolute certainty ' .
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The Mexico -Telecoms Panel was also given the opportunity to pronounce on the interpretation of the necessity requirement laid down in paragraph (5)(e) of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications. Pursuant to this provision, Members are required to ensure that the only conditions imposed on access to and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services are those necessary to attain the policy objectives identifi ed in paragraph (5)(e). 74 The Panel took issue with the AB's fi nding in Korea -Beef, and hence ruled that, in the case at hand, the necessity standard could not be regarded as being closer to the ' pole of indispensable ' . On the contrary, the Panel asserted that, for the purposes of the case at issue, the meaning of the term ' necessary ' should be deemed to be closer to the meaning of ' making a contribution to ' the achievement of one of the objectives listed in paragraph (5)(e). 75 This deviation from the AB jurisprudence is not justifi ed. In this case, the Panel misconstrued the Korea -Beef ruling and the wording of paragraph (5)(e). It read into the provision words that are not there and imported a concept, i.e., that ' necessary ' is equal to ' making a contribution to ' , that, apparently, was not intended.
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C Article 2(2) TBT
Article 2(2) TBT provides for a positive obligation where the complaining party bears the burden of providing evidence of the responding Member's failure to adopt a ' necessary ' measure. 77 There are at least two important elements worth discussing in the TBT necessity test: fi rst, the test covers not only measures of trade-restrictive intent , but also measures that have the effect of so operating. Secondly, the necessity standard set out therein is qualifi ed, in that the measure chosen should be the least traderestrictive taking into account the risks that the measure addresses and the importance of attaining the objective at issue . Thus, the WTO judiciary is called upon to juxtapose the challenged technical regulations 78 with the types of risks that would be created in the absence of such regulations. 79 In other words, a variety of cost -benefi t analysis appears to be implied in Article 2(2) TBT. Viewed from another angle, this provision appears to allow for a considerable margin of appreciation when domestic authorities regulate.
In EC -Sardines , although only Article 2(4) TBT was at issue, there were some indirect references to Article 2(2), notably as regards the ' legitimate objectives ' concept. More specifi cally, it was stated that Article 2(2) entails an illustrative list of objectives that Members expressly deemed legitimate. In turn, legitimate objectives in Article 2(2) and (4) should be construed to mean one and the same thing.
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As regards the burden of proof associated with Article 2(4) TBT, the AB took issue with the Panel's view and ruled that it is for the complaining party to prove that a relevant international standard had not been used as a basis for the contested measures, although this standard would be an effective and appropriate means to achieve the desired legitimate objectives. 81 Oddly, the AB went on to express its agreement with the Panel's fi nding that ' the second part of Article 2.4 implies that there must be an examination and a determination on the legitimacy of the objectives of the measure ' .
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This leads me to the following advocatus diaboli interpretation: In EC -Sardines , both parties to the dispute agreed that the objectives sought by the EC were legitimate (that is, market transparency, consumer protection, and fair competition) and, therefore, the Panel ended its analysis at that point. 83 Furthermore, a Panel would not challenge the legitimacy of an objective that is already in the Article 2(2) TBT (indicative) list. But what about the other objectives that this list potentially encompasses, as it is an indicative one? According to the EC -Sardines case law, these objectives will be deemed legitimate only after the WTO adjudicating bodies have examined and determined their legitimacy. Then, such an interpretation appears to distinguish between two categories of objectives: the fi rst category covers those objectives that are expressly referred to in Article 2(2) TBT and, a fortiori , escape the ' legitimacy determination ' test. These objectives will be subject to a means -ends test scrutinizing the ' degree of connection ' between the measure and the objective. The second category comprises objectives that are implied only in Article 2(2). 84 If the parties to a dispute disagree as to their legitimacy, these objectives must be ' legitimized ' by the adjudicating bodies.
Such an interpretation appears to be fairly sweeping at the present stage of integration in the WTO. 
D Article 5(6) SPS
Article 5(6) SPS contains the most important necessity test laid down in the SPS Agreement. This necessity test is subject to a ' reasonable availability ' qualifi cation, 85 which summarizes the GATT/WTO jurisprudence on necessity while adding to it SPSspecifi c elements, such as a de minimis requirement that the alternative SPS measure be signifi cantly less trade-inhibitory. The SPS Agreement is the fi rst to include in its text some guidance regarding the SPS measures that can be deemed ' more traderestrictive than required ' .
In the Australia -Salmon dispute, the issue at stake was whether Australia's import ban on fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon was more trade-restrictive than required to attain Australia's appropriate level of protection. 86 The AB endorsed the Panel's fi nding that a three-pronged test is established in Article 5(6) SPS, which comprises three elements that apply cumulatively. 87 Hence, in order for an alternative SPS measure to be considered as less trade-restrictive than the contested measure, it must: (a) be reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility; and (b) achieve the level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection appropriate to the Member; and (c) be signifi cantly less trade-restrictive than the SPS measure contested.
The AB offered numerous crucial interpretations in this case, especially as regards the ' appropriate level of protection ' standard and rejected the Panel's fi ndings in this respect. At the outset, the AB emphasized that the determination of the appropriate level of protection is a prerogative reserved to Members. The ' appropriate level of protection ' is an objective the determination of which (made by the Member concerned) 88 precedes the adoption of the SPS measure, which is an instrument that aims to achieve that objective. 89 Thus, Members are implicitly required to determine their level of protection in an unequivocal manner. It is only when a Member fails to determine the level of protection it deems appropriate (or when there is vagueness as to the appropriate level) that the WTO adjudicating bodies should be allowed to secondguess the appropriate level of protection based on the level of protection as refl ected in the SPS measure actually applied. 90 In examining a Member's determination of the appropriate level of protection, the adjudicating bodies will identify the underlying objective behind the contested measure and then examine whether the actual level of protection as refl ected in the contested measure corresponds to the level of protection that the responding Member deems appropriate. 91 As regards the burden of proof in 85 Footnote 3 to Art. 5(6) SPS; see also A proliferation of RIAs has occurred in recent years. Such agreements strive for deeper and wider integration of services markets of the participating Members. The interaction between regional initiatives and the multilateral efforts under the aegis of the GATS appears to be mutually advantageous. Indeed, these two concurrent layers of liberalization efforts have proven, and will most likely continue to be, complementary. 94 On the one hand, RIAs have benefi ted from the GATS legal drafting, and hence many RIAs echo in their texts, and build on, several GATS provisions. For example, Article VI in general (and paragraph (4) in particular) appears -with some alteration to the wording -in manifold RIAs. Thus, numerous RIAs display a certain degree of standardization. On the other hand, RIAs can be indispensable ' laboratories ' from which useful lessons can be learnt, thus empowering the negotiating capacity of the countries that participate in the multilateral arena, and enriching as well as expediting multilateral negotiations on services. 95 The most comprehensive necessity tests at the regional level regarding trade in services are to be found in MERCOSUR and the Trans-Pacifi c Strategic Economic Partnership (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore). Article X(4) of the MERCOSUR Protocol of Montevideo) 96 establishes a clear-cut GATS-type horizontal necessity test with respect to measures relating to qualifi cations, licensing, and technical standards. Likewise, paragraph (2) of Article 12.10 of the Trans-Pacifi c Strategic Economic Partnership, which entered into force on 28 May 2006, embodies a strong horizontal necessity test which refl ects the criteria established under Article VI(4) GATS. 97 The application of this necessity test will generate further liberalization of services trade and regulatory reform in the participating Members ' markets and is likely to affect negotiations at the multilateral level.
Recently, the United States has signed bilateral trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, and Australia. These arrangements also entail a binding necessity test which 92 Appellate Body Report, Japan -Agricultural Products II , supra note 68, at para. 126. 93 See also Table 1 . The Chapter of the Agreement on Services will apply to Brunei 2 years after its entry into force. is applicable across services sectors when it comes to measures relating to licensing, qualifi cations, and technical standards. There are, nevertheless, two important caveats: fi rst, the language that the respective provisions use is hortatory, simply requesting that participants ' endeavour to ensure ' the objectivity, transparency, and necessity of the Article VI(4)-like measures; and, secondly, Members are bound to endorse the results of the WPDR negotiations on Article VI(4) when they enter into effect. 98 An approach similar to that of the GATS is adopted in Article 64 of the JapanSingapore Free Trade Agreement. While Article 64(5) entails a necessity test with respect to licensing, qualifi cations, and technical standards, there are many qualifi cations like those found under Article VI(5) GATS which make it almost impossible to bring a case based on this provision. 99 There is also a variant of this type of regional arrangement where participating Members agree ' jointly [to] review ' the results of the WPDR negotiations. In the meantime, these Members are required to abide by an obligation which is identical to that in Article VI(5) GATS, that is that, pending the WPDR negotiations, they apply the Article VI(4)(a), (b), and (c) criteria in sectors where specifi c commitments were undertaken. This is notably the case with the RIAs that Singapore concluded separately with EFTA, Australia, and New Zealand.
In addition to RIAs which espouse a GATS-type approach, there are other RIAs that are modelled on NAFTA, notably in the Western Hemisphere. 100 Such arrangements do not encompass a provision similar to Article VI, but, instead, they contain more narrowly drawn disciplines regarding the licensing and certifi cation of professionals originating in the territories of the participating Members. 101 In addition, these disciplines use ' best-efforts ' language. In general, NAFTA-type agreements incorporate a provision similar to Article 1210 NAFTA, which requires that licensing or certifi cation measures be based on objective and transparent criteria, and that these be neither more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service, nor constitute a disguised restriction on the cross-border supply of the service at issue. However, unlike the GATS, NAFTA-type agreements call for comprehensive mutual recognition of foreign education credentials and professional qualifi cations in several professions. Work in these areas, though, has made little progress.
While there is a set of RIAs that embody a horizontally applicable necessity test using ' best-efforts ' language, many RIAs simply declare their determination to respect Article VI(5) GATS and to incorporate the disciplines on domestic regulation with respect to licensing, qualifi cations, and technical standards that will emerge from the WPDR negotiations. There are other RIAs the coverage of which is fairly narrow and includes only the licensing and certifi cation of professionals. Such RIAs add nothing to the concept of necessity and how this should be interpreted, but they borrow the wording of Article VI(4)/(5) GATS and simply adapt it to their needs, preferences, and the level of homogeneity between the participating Members. In fact, such RTA provisions usually appear to be less far-reaching than the GATS, as participating Members are reluctant to expand on Article VI(4) or include more categories of measures than this provision currently covers. 102 The sluggish progress at the regional level runs counter to the idea of encouraging the creation of optimum harmonization areas as an optimal fi rst step of further multilateral liberalization. 103 At least with respect to non-discriminatory non-quantitative domestic regulations, the regional lessons that can be learnt are, at best, poor and add nothing to the prospective multilateral Article VI(4) disciplines. Nevertheless, several RIAs have made important contributions to developing the transparency provisions that should accompany any efforts to liberalize domestic regulations pertaining to licensing, qualifi cations, or technical standards. Indeed, in this case one could speak of GATS+ outcomes at a regional level.
Among RIAs, the experience within the EU is the exception. In the EU context, however, the political determination to move to deeper and wider forms of integration already existed. This process has been facilitated by an integration-promoting supranational judiciary, which has made its presence felt through far-reaching interpretations to which the EU Member States assented. One such concept, fashioned by the ECJ, is the principle of proportionality. 104 While proportionality goes back to German law, 105 the ECJ recognizes it as a general principle of EC law. 106 Article 5(3) ECT embodies one part of the three-pronged proportionality test, i.e., the necessity requirement, and there is also a Protocol clarifying the meaning of the principle. 107 Nevertheless, the ECJ does not search for a legal basis to justify its decision to use proportionality, but merely notes that it is a general principle of EC law.
According to established case law, a measure is proportionate if it is: (a) suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective pursued; (b) necessary, i.e., the least onerous among several appropriate measures (proportionality lato sensu ); and (c) stricto sensu proportionate, that is, the disadvantages (these are usually damage to individual interests) are not disproportionate to the objectives (these usually serve the public or the Community interest). 108 Stricto sensu proportionality entails a cost -benefi t analysis, the only difference being that the ECJ will not necessarily invalidate an act solely for the reason that the costs exceed the benefi ts. Notably, the ECJ applies the third sub-set of the proportionality test in areas where EC law clearly establishes a common level of protection of the legitimate objective at issue, e.g., consumer protection.
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Generally, the application of proportionality has been fairly fl exible to protect different interests and thus the degree of judicial review has varied considerably. 110 It is, however, safe to argue that ' the more intensive the [ECJ] scrutiny of national restrictions in the light of the proportionality principle, the greater the shift in powers from the national legislatures to the European judiciary ' .
111 Again, in numerous cases, the ECJ, conscious of the complex assessments of a political, economic, and social nature that the Community organs or the authorities of a Member State may be called upon to undertake, confi ned its judicial review in an assessment of whether the challenged measure was manifestly inappropriate in the light of the objective pursued by the competent institutions.
112 In other cases the ECJ, au lieu of expressly scrutinizing whether the measure at stake was stricto sensu proportionate, favoured the undertaking of a ' marginal review ' of costs and benefi ts of the contested measure under the guise of the necessity requirement. Nevertheless, this should not be taken as suggesting that the judicial review focuses on the existence of alternatives, since the quintessence of proportionality seems to be a balancing test weighing the objective of a given measure against its adverse effects.
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Essential Elements of a Horizontal Necessity TestThe Paradigm of the Accountancy Disciplines
It would certainly be imprudent automatically to transpose the interpretations of necessity in the other WTO Agreements or in a regional or sub-regional agreement to Article VI(4) GATS. Nonetheless, it is argued here that drawing on accumulated GATT/WTO 109 In the Estée Lauder case, for instance, the ECJ suggested that the level of protection that Member States seek when they adopt measures that affect intra-EU trade to protect consumers must refl ect ' the presumed expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect ' . as well as regional experience can assist in creating an effective horizontal necessity test through the WPDR negotiations. This section will start with the necessity test created for the accountancy services under the auspices of the WPPS and then consider the elements that can form part of a horizontal necessity test, drawing on the accountancy disciplines, the analysis of the case law under GATT, TBT, and SPS, and on regional lessons.
A The Necessity Test in Paragraph (2) of the Accountancy Disciplines
The WPPS fi rst assumed the diffi cult task of operationalizing the Article VI(4) legal mandate with respect to accountancy services 114 and concluded its work on 14 December 1998 with the adoption by the CTS of the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector , alias the ' draft accountancy disciplines ' . 115 These apply only to Members that undertook specifi c commitments in the accountancy sector and should become part of the GATS, i.e., legally binding, no later than the end of the current round of services negotiations. 116 The salient feature of these disciplines is the inclusion of a binding, sector-specifi c necessity test in paragraph (2) of the disciplines.
Paragraph (2) makes it clear that measures falling under Article XVI or XVII are not covered by this necessity test. Arguably, the administrative aspects of the Art icle XVI or XVII measures relating to accountancy would still fall within the ambit of the accountancy disciplines and be covered by the necessity test. Furthermore, paragraph (2) requires that trade-restrictiveness should be neither the objective nor the result of the application of the regulatory measure at stake, thereby establishing a purpose and effect test. In this respect, paragraph (2) borrows the wording of Article 2(2) TBT, which equally covers the intent and the effect of creating unnecessary traderestrictiveness. In addition, the accountancy disciplines impose a necessity test for relevant technical standards by requiring that they be prepared, adopted, and/or applied only to fulfi l legitimate objectives as set out in paragraph (2).
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This provision also contains an illustrative list of four legitimate objectives that a Member can pursue, namely, consumer protection, quality of the service, professional competence, and/or integrity of the profession. By comparison, Article VI(4)(b) considers the quality of the service as the only objective that can justify the burdensomeness of a measure relating to licensing, qualifi cations, or technical standards. Therefore, by expanding the list of objectives that are deemed explicitly legitimate, paragraph (2) already contains a stronger necessity test than Article VI(4)/(5) GATS. This is so because, in the case of the accountancy disciplines, Members agreed unequivocally on four (rather than one, as under Article VI(4)) legitimate objectives which the adjudicating bodies are bound to take into account when they examine the link between the measure elected and the objective. This explicit reference to specifi c objectives in paragraph (2) is decisive, especially when a parallel is drawn with Article 2(2) and (5) TBT. Article 2(2) contains a necessity test and an indicative list of legitimate objectives. In Article 2(5), however, the rebuttable presumption of necessity appears to cover only those technical regulations that are prepared, adopted, or applied for one of the legitimate objectives explicitly referred to in Article 2(2). A contrario , then, other possible legitimate objectives that could come under Article 2(2) do not benefi t from the Article 2(5) presumption simply because they are not explicitly mentioned in Article 2(2). Consequently, this provision appears to establish a hierarchy of legitimate objectives, i.e., objectives that take advantage of the presumption and objectives that do not have this benefi t. Hence, the recognition of an objective as legitimate through its inclusion in an indicative list can have important ramifi cations.
' Quality ' can undoubtedly be construed broadly to cover not only the delivery to the consumer, but also reliability, effi ciency, and comprehensiveness as well as objectives associated with externalities and public policy. 118 To date, the AB has advanced a rather narrow interpretation of necessity in provisions entailing an exception , such as Article XX GATT. 119 Nevertheless, one cannot prejudge the interpretation of the phrase ' necessary to ensure the quality of the service ' in a case involving an obligation provision, such as Article VI(4). As things stand, one could reasonably suggest that measures pertaining to licensing, qualifi cations, or technical standards that do not relate stricto sensu to the quality of the service would be outlawed under Article VI(4). 120 Measures that serve important social objectives could fall within this category, e.g., the obligation to supply a service in a bottleneck service sector in underserved regions of a given Member's territory at lower prices than in urban areas, or a regulation that aims to minimize the environmental impact of a given service.
As noted earlier, the WTO adjudicating bodies have taken a deferential approach towards Members ' regulatory autonomy. However, it would be reasonable for the AB to dismiss an interpretation that would equate the phrase ' ensure the quality of the service ' to the phrase ' ensure the fulfi lment of a legitimate objective ' . In addition, no persuasive argument can be made that, while ' quality of the service ' should be interpreted broadly under Article VI(4) in order to cover various objectives, inter alia , professional competence, under paragraph (2) of the accountancy disciplines, the same objective, i.e., the quality of the service, must be interpreted narrowly, so that it does not overlap with professional competence, which is listed as a separate legitimate objective. Recourse to Article XIV GATS would always be possible, but in this case it would be incumbent upon the responding party to establish the affi rmative defence under one of the exceptions defi ned in an exhaustive manner. 121 Undeniably, the creation of a necessity test as laid down in paragraph (2) of the accountancy disciplines was a success. But it will be necessary to wait for the disciplines to become binding before it is possible to evaluate precisely the impact that the necessity test will have on the accountancy sector and the extent of sectoral regulatory reform that it will bring about. Meanwhile, the accountancy disciplines, and the necessity test in particular, exert considerable infl uence over the current work of the WPDR regarding the development of horizontal disciplines and serve as a useful parameter or guide in this respect.
B Elements and Wording of a Prospective Horizontal Necessity Test
For the creation of an effective, enforceable, and operationally useful horizontal necessity test WPDR negotiators could build on elements and wording adopted in other WTO Agreements. As regards the RIAs, the only arrangement that appears to be of interest for the purposes of the work of the WPDR is the European Union. All the other arrangements are either contemporary with, or proliferated in the aftermath of, the GATS and consequently refl ect the structure, scope, and concepts of Article VI(4) GATS. Therefore, guidance cannot be sought from such agreements. In contrast, paragraph (2) of the accountancy disciplines is a useful benchmark, and Members acknowledged this in their WPDR discussions. In sum, the following elements emerge as common denominators relating to the concept of necessity in the WTO. These denominators extend beyond the strict confi nes of any particular WTO Agreement and do not seem to be dependent on whether necessity forms part of a WTO provision referring to an obligation or, rather, an exception . 123 
Burden of Proof
The allocation of the burden of proof is clear-cut as regards provisions establishing a positive obligation (such as paragraph (2) of the accountancy disciplines or the prospective necessity test under Article VI(4)). The complaining party bears the initial onus probandi and, once the violation of the necessity requirement is established, it is for the responding party to rebut the charge. 
Justiciability of Instruments/Level of Protection/Legitimate Objectives
Consistent WTO case law suggests that the objectives that a Member seeks to pursue will not be subject to judicial review. The legitimacy of the desired ends or the level of protection that the responding Member deems appropriate is unilaterally defi ned and 
Less Trade-restrictiveness/Reasonable Availability, and Comparison of Alternatives/ ' Third Aspect ' of Necessity
According to established WTO case law, 128 for a measure to be deemed necessary it has to be designed to protect the interest at issue or to fulfi l the objective pursued. Moreover, the ' nexus ' -or degree of connection -between the measure and the legitimate objective should be suffi ciently tight. 129 Furthermore, a measure is ' necessary ' when there is no reasonably available alternative measure which is less trade-restrictive and which could attain the same level of protection as, or fulfi l a legitimate objective equally satisfactorily with, the contested measure. Hence, in the fi rst instance, the adjudicating bodies will look for concrete alternative measures. In so doing, the panels will examine whether less trade-restrictive measures are already applied by the responding party to achieve the same objectives as the challenged trade-restrictive measure.
130 After having identifi ed a specifi c alternative measure that is reasonably available to the responding party, 131 the panels will proceed to a comparison between the contested and the 125 Although an import prohibition is normally ' the heaviest " weapon " in a Member's armoury of trade measures ' : Appellate Body Report, US -Shrimp , supra note 5, at para. 171. This deference towards the level of protection chosen by a country can also be identifi ed in ECJ rulings. See, for instance, Case C -36/02, Omega 25. See also the discussion in Section 5A. 128 Inter alia , Appellate Body Report, Korea -Beef , supra note 33, at para. 157. 129 Ibid ., at para. 161. 130 The fact that other Members may employ less restrictive measures to tackle similar situations does not render a measure in a given Member unnecessary: see Case C -384/93, Alpine Investments , supra note 110, at para. 51. 131 Supra note 56. alternative measures. The comparison of available alternatives is crucial and, indeed, inherent in any objective evaluation of necessity. When comparing the measures, it is taken for granted that both protect the interest at stake or achieve the legitimate objective equally effectively . The comparison will be made on the basis of the illustrative list of factors that the Korea -Beef jurisprudence identifi ed, i.e., (a) the relative importance of the interest or values at stake; (b) the contribution of each of the measures to the realization of the ends pursued by it and whether the design of the measures is suitable to fulfi l the objective pursued (i.e., means -ends test); and (c) the degree of trade-restrictiveness. 132 Obviously, a considerable margin of appreciation exists in this analysis of qualitative nature and, thus, second-best measures may be deemed WTOconsistent depending on the circumstances and the interests at stake.
In the WPDR jargon, the idea that a measure that restricts trade can still be deemed necessary if there is no alternative, less trade-disruptive, and reasonably available measure that a Member could take to achieve the same policy objective echoes the ' third aspect ' of the necessity test. While it has been suggested that the ' third aspect ' is an essential part of any necessity test, as it contains the comparison of alternatives, it was revealed during the WPDR negotiations that several Members would consider it too burdensome a concept to be applied horizontally. 133 Arguably, this burden could be alleviated by considering the introduction of concepts available under the TBT or the SPS. In the TBT necessity test analysed earlier, the adjudicating bodies should take into account ' the risks non-fulfi lment [of the legitimate objective at issue] would create ' . 134 This implies a delicate balancing of the costs and benefi ts in which costs (or risks) require careful evaluation. In Article 5(6) SPS there are also elements that Members could consider in the process of creating a necessity test for the purposes of Article VI(4): fi rst and foremost, the de minimis requirement that the alternative measure should meet, as it should be signifi cantly less trade-restrictive than the measure actually chosen. Another valuable element in the SPS provision is the technical and economic feasibility concept, although this concept appears to encapsulate the WTO jurisprudence on the conditions that render a measure reasonably unavailable .
Proportionality/Balancing/Means -Ends Test
Having analysed the WTO jurisprudence on necessity and the ECJ application of proportionality, a reader can easily identify similarities as well as differences. Notably after the introduction of the concept of ' weighing and balancing ' in Korea -Beef , the WTO adjudicating bodies have come closer to the tests that the ECJ applies in order to pronounce on the legality of national regulatory measures. 135 Then, the necessity test as it is applied at present in the WTO also entails two of the three conditions that 132 Also Appellate Body Report, Brazil -Retreaded Tyres , supra note 38, at para. (2) TBT. 135 Regan argues that the concept of weighing and balancing is diffi cult to reconcile with Members ' freedom to choose their level of protection. Actually, he argues, the WTO judiciary does not apply a cost-benefi t balancing test when it examines necessity under Arts XX GATT and XIV GATS: Regan, supra note 43.
render a measure proportionate in the EC context: fi rst, the suitability requirement, which examines whether the measure is suitable to attain the Member's desired objective or the level of protection (causal relationship); 136 and, secondly, the necessity requirement, which examines whether the measure is necessary for the achievement of a given objective.
As the ECJ often does not have recourse to the third requirement of the proportionality test ( stricto sensu proportionate) in order to consider a measure proportionate, the differences between the tests that the EC and the WTO judiciaries apply are not so intractable. Of course, this by no means implies that the proportionality test as applied by the ECJ can be transposed to the WTO legal order. Again, the means -ends test is inherent in both tests, and so is balancing.
137 Cost -benefi t analysis, on the other hand, is arguably included in the stricto sensu proportionality.
138 However, it is diffi cult for an international court to undertake such a primarily quantitative analysis, fi rst, because of the absence of legitimacy, but, more fundamentally, because of the lack of factual information. In this regard, it is worth noting that in many cases the ECJ, although it has suffi cient legitimacy, exercises judicial self-restraint and leaves the fi nal decision on whether the measure satisfi es the proportionality standard to the national court. Before doing this, however, the ECJ will provide the national court with some guidelines. 
Burdensomeness vs. Trade-restrictiveness
This issue arose early in the WPDR discussions, and Members appear to agree that these concepts have practically the same meaning. 140 This approach is perhaps convenient from a negotiator's viewpoint, but does not seem to derive from the Article VI(4) text itself. This provision seems to suggest a two-fold task for the WPDR, one under the chapeau and another under the body of the provision: fi rst, Members are to ensure that measures relating to QRP, LRP, and TS do not constitute unnecessary trade barriers. This is the ultimate objective of the Article VI(4) work programme. Secondly, the disciplines that Members are called upon to develop must ensure that such measures are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service (and, arguably, of the service supplier). The accountancy disciplines replaced this with the phrase ' not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfi l a legitimate objective ' , thereby adopting TBT-type language. In paragraph (15) of the disciplines, however, Members are required to make sure that application procedures and the related documentation are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure that applicants fulfi l qualifi cation and licensing requirements, and that the establishment of the authenticity of documents be sought through the least burdensome procedure. Then, following an interpretation that is faithful to the texts of Article VI(4) and the accountancy disciplines, trade-restrictiveness and burdensomeness can be construed to mean different things. 141 There are two possibilities for overcoming this interpretative conundrum. 142 The fi rst would advocate that, while trade-restrictiveness is not mentioned in Article VI(4), the objective of a prospective necessity test is to discipline measures relating to LRPs, QRPs, and TS so that they do not create unnecessary trade barriers. 143 Therefore, only the existence of an unnecessary trade-restrictive measure could give rise to a successful complaint before the WTO adjudicating bodies. The mere argument that a measure is ineffi cient or over-burdensome, while not restrictive of trade, would not be suffi cient to challenge a measure under Article VI(4) and the nascent disciplines thereunder. The second possibility would be to stick to the text and suggest that a prospective necessity test should consist of two subsets: an external and an internal layer of judicial review. First, the adjudicating bodies will examine whether the measure at issue (relating to licensing, qualifi cations, or technical standards) unnecessarily hampers trade in services. If so, under the internal layer, judicial scrutiny would then focus on the burdensomeness of the measure vis-à-vis the legitimate objective that it seeks to pursue, e.g., ensuring the quality of the service. If, however, a given measure is found not to be more trade-restrictive than necessary, would the adjudicating bodies have the right to outlaw such a measure on the basis that it was unduly burdensome? If so, this would mean that in the absence of a trade restriction the WTO adjudicating bodies would still have a say in unduly burdensome regulations. A similar interpretation would surely undermine the regulatory sovereignty of the Members. In practice, in the WPDR discussions, Members use the two terms interchangeably. necessity requirement, bringing a considerable degree of coherence, legal certainty, and textual uniformity. Of course, Members could add to these concepts the clarifi cations that they deem apposite in the case of services trade and thus reduce the probability of judicial activism.
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Proposals for a Necessity Test Under Article VI(4) GATS
Because Article VI(4) can be likened to a potentially powerful positive-integrationtype provision, the completion of the Article VI(4) mandate may contribute to greater regulatory co-operation and convergence, and/or pressures towards harmonization and recognition of domestic regulations dealing with licensing, qualifi cations, or technical standards. 146 Although this is not going to occur in the near future, it fuels caution and wariness on the part of regulators in capitals and negotiators in Geneva. After a critical review of the proposals submitted to date to the WPDR and which advocate a horizontal necessity test, 147 this section will explore a number of related questions and concerns, both services-inherent and political.
A Untangling the Proposals Advocating a Horizontal Necessity Test
Seven communications have so far been submitted to the WPDR proposing a horizontal necessity test covering the fi ve types of measures identifi ed under the Article VI(4) chapeau .
148 Recently, the WPDR Chairman circulated the fi rst consolidated draft text on possible regulatory disciplines under Article VI(4). This documents draws on the proposals analysed below. 
Proposal Submitted by Australia
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Australia was the fi rst to propose a horizontal necessity test modelled on Article 5(6) SPS and footnote 3 thereto. According to Australia, ' a measure is not more traderestrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility , that achieves a legitimate policy objective and is signifi cantly less restrictive to trade ' (emphasis added). A TBT-type test, according to Australia, would not be an appropriate solution, as the concepts in the SPS test are more germane to services. Furthermore, inspired by the accountancy disciplines, Australia favoured the introduction of an illustrative list of legitimate objectives which 145 Just as was done in the SPS Agreement by incorporating footnote 3 to Art. 5(6). 146 The necessity test is indeed a form of ' forced recognition ' : Productivity Commission and Australian National University, Achieving Better Regulation of Services, Conference Proceedings (2000), at 56. 147 There have also been proposals for introducing a necessity test with respect to a specifi c category of Art.
VI (4) could include the protection of consumers, the quality of the service, professional competence, the integrity of the profession, and administrative effi ciency and fairness.
Proposal Submitted by Korea
151
Korea's proposal also had some elements originating in the SPS relevant provisions. Korea suggested the following wording: ' Members shall ensure that such measures are not more restrictive to trade in services than necessary to achieve a legitimate policy objective [as specifi ed herein]. [For this purpose,] a measure is deemed not more trade restrictive than necessary, unless there is another less restrictive measure reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility ' . This wording embraces the so-called ' third aspect ' as well as the relevant GATT/WTO jurisprudence.
Proposal Submitted by the EC
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The EC proposal did not include any specifi c wording, but it emphasized the importance of having a horizontal necessity test and a defi nition of necessity that could be valid regardless of services sector, and identifi ed several important features that the necessity test should encompass. In the EC's view, a measure that is not the least trade-restrictive but is proportionate to the objective stated and pursued should still be regarded as necessary. According to the EC, the validity of, rationale for, or appropriateness of any policy objective cannot be questioned by the WTO judiciary. The proposed proportionality test would incorporate several concepts to be found in other WTO Agreements, such as the technical and economic feasibility and the risks that non-fulfi lment would create, but also the level of development of a given Member, or the specifi cities of the sector at stake. It would not, however, be the same as the farreaching proportionality test applied by the ECJ.
necessity test laid down in the accountancy disciplines, also differs from it in several important ways: fi rst, it applies to measures of general application. Hence, it also covers measures that are subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII. Arguably, this implies that the regulatory aspects and the administration of these measures will be judged against Article VI(4) future disciplines. Secondly, Japan does not deem it necessary to establish a list of legitimate objectives. All national policy objectives are de facto legitimate and their legitimacy should not be scrutinized by the adjudicating bodies, but only the instruments that a Member employs in order to attain them. 
Proposal Submitted by Switzerland
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The Swiss proposal appears to encompass two necessity tests. The fi rst reproduces the wording of Article VI(4) and informs the entirety of the proposed horizontal disciplines that follow. 157 Indeed, this provision refl ects the objective of the disciplines. Nevertheless, the Article VI(4) criteria become concrete in paragraph (10), which embodies the main necessity test of this proposal:
Members agree to ensure that measures of general application relating to licensing requirements and procedures, qualifi cation requirements and procedures as well as technical standards are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfi l a national policy objective , taking account of the risks non-fulfi lment would create . Bearing in mind that nothing shall prevent a Member from availing of the rights granted under XIV, XIVbis, such national policy objectives are, inter alia : the access to essential services; the quality of the service; professional competence; or the integrity of the profession. Requirements shall be based on objective and transparent criteria. [Emphasis added] As in the Japanese proposal, the disciplines proffered by Switzerland would equally apply to measures subject to scheduling. It also adopts the language used by Japan, in preferring the term ' national policy objective ' to the term ' legitimate objective ' . In fact, the former is to be found in the GATS Preamble, and hence may be considered more ' GATSspecifi c ' than the latter. The Swiss proposal, contrary to that submitted by Australia, considers the TBT-type wording more suitable and adds the risks of non-fulfi lment of a given objective to the elements that the adjudicating bodies should consider in their judicial scrutiny. Finally, it incorporates an open-ended list of objectives that may be relevant, such as access to essential services or the integrity of the profession.
burdensome than necessary to meet national policy objectives; and (iii) in the case of qualifi cation and licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service. [Emphasis added] In this case, too, the horizontal necessity test would apply only to committed sectors. The proponents of this proposal also prefer the terms ' burdensome ' and ' national policy objectives ' to ' trade-restrictive ' and ' legitimate objectives ' , respectively, like in this respect the Japanese proposal. The innovative feature of this test (representing a view now shared by most Members) is that it adds the qualifi cation procedures in Article VI(4)(c). Indeed, introducing such an obligation to the disciplines is in the interest of those service suppliers aiming to provide their services in a foreign market. This obligation can be an important step towards further liberalization in mode 4 notably with respect to professional services.
It should be noted that the proponents submitted a revision of their proposal in May 2006 (presented by Brazil and Philippines) from which the necessity test had been removed. They justifi ed their decision by arguing that while Article VI(4), accompanied by the criteria, contains the mandate and the aims of the negotiations, there is no actual requirement or legal obligation to translate the necessity test laid down therein into any regulatory disciplines. In a proposal submitted at the same time, the ACP Group also expressed its disagreement with the inclusion of a necessity test in the future disciplines because it would endanger its domestic regulatory prerogatives. 159 Other Members, however, insist that without a necessity test, the Article VI(4) mandate is not fulfi lled.
The latter approach appears to be in line not only with the text of Article VI(4), but also with the early negotiating history of the discussions on domestic regulation. Australia et al. 160 This is the most recent and probably most comprehensive proposal to date. As in the majority of the proposals submitted, the proponents clarify that these disciplines are applicable to measures in committed sectors. Furthermore, these disciplines codify the WPDR discussions on the issue of scope by making it clear that the disciplines, although not applicable to limitations subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII, cover all measures administering such limitations and relating to LRP, QRP, and TS. The test that they put forward underscores the general objective that the prospective disciplines should serve and essentially transforms the Article VI(4) wording into a legal obligation by stating:
Proposal Submitted by
The purpose of these disciplines is to facilitate trade in services by ensuring that measures relating to licensing requirements and procedures, qualifi cation requirements and procedures, and technical standards do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services. In applying these disciplines, Members shall have regard to the objectives of Article VI:4 of the GATS. In this regard, these disciplines aim to ensure that such measures are (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more burdensome than necessary to meet specifi c national policy objectives including to ensure the quality of the service; and (c) in the case of licensing and qualifi cation procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service. [Emphasis added] Additionally, Members are required, when preparing or applying Article VI(4) measures, to ensure that these measures ' are not formulated, introduced, implemented, administered or applied with a view to creating unnecessary barriers to trade in services ' . 161 In derogation from the accountancy disciplines and the Japanese proposal, it is only the protectionist intent that should be condemned under this provision. Such an intent can be traced at any stage before the adoption of a given measure. It follows that an Article VI(4) measure that would generate a similar effect would fall outside the scope of this obligation.
The proposed necessity test includes an open-ended list of objectives. In addition, the objectives have to be specifi c. Arguably, the rationale behind an Article VI(4) measure should be easily identifi able. This necessity test also seeks to ensure that none of the procedural rules relating to licensing or qualifi cations are in themselves a restriction on the supply of a given service. The originality of this proposal is that it introduces a generally applicable necessity test and then, for each separate category of Article VI(4) measures, provides a category-specifi c necessity test. In the case of technical standards, for instance, it provides for a TBT-type necessity test. This means that the general necessity test is likely to remain out of judicial reach. This is because a measure that would fall within the ambit of these disciplines will always be in one of the categories mentioned in Article VI(4). Thus, logically, this measure will be scrutinized pursuant to the category-specifi c necessity test rather than the general one. However, the latter serves as a yardstick or a guideline to remind regulators and adjudicators that necessity is a concept that they should take into account.
B Common Ground among the Proposals
Several fi ndings are apparent from these proposals. First, Members appear increasingly to be in agreement that the future disciplines will apply only to committed sectors. Nevertheless, this is in sharp contrast to the text of Article VI(4), which, unlike paragraphs (1), (3), (5), and (6) of Article VI, does not include a similar qualifi cation. Members disregarded this in the case of accountancy, and it seems that they will repeat this error here. Another element that emerges is that Members prefer an indicative list of national policy objectives, the legitimacy of which should not be questioned. This list may include the quality of the service as an example of objectives of this kind. An interesting element is also that there will defi nitely be derogations/transitional periods/sunset provisions, or, alternatively, best-endeavours language for the LDCs and perhaps for the developing countries as well, depending on the level of development of their services sectors. Best-endeavour language may also be used in specifi c provisions such as those relating to sophisticated transparency disciplines (prior comment mechanisms, etc.).
Services-inherent and Political Concerns Relating to the Adoption of a Horizontal Necessity Test
A services-inherent concern at the beginning of the services negotiations was whether the creation of a horizontally applicable necessity test was feasible, given the extensive sectoral diversity. However, given that the reasons for regulating, e.g., market failures, externalities, abuse of market power, or information asymmetries, are similar whatever the services sector, a horizontal approach makes sense. Besides, Members never ruled out the possibility of developing sector-specifi c disciplines. In fact, the two approaches are considered to be reinforcing and complementary. Of course, in a horizontal approach there is always a risk of not bringing the negotiations to a close because of the number of substantial issues that have to be addressed. Nevertheless, the proposals analysed above demonstrate that a horizontal approach can bring satisfactory results. In addition, in negotiations of such magnitude, the mutual interests are more easily identifi able. For instance, objective, transparent, and least trade-restrictive licensing and qualifi cation requirements and procedures have obvious implications for modes 3 and 4. Under the current WPDR negotiations, Members have demonstrated in essence their willingness to conclude their discussions with the creation of horizontal disciplines, no matter how unsatisfactory these disciplines may be at the end of this Round due to possible derogations or transitional periods, or because of the weak ' bite ' of the disciplines. Hence, the momentum for creating horizontal disciplines under Article VI(4) is considerable and, for many, a necessity test should form part of such disciplines.
Furthermore, the quality of the outcome of the WPDR negotiations will depend on the degree of involvement of national regulators in the negotiations. To date, the involvement of national regulators has been marginal. 162 As the time for the creation of a draft text approaches, national regulators start to become more active in the drafting of specifi c disciplines on licensing, qualifi cations, or standards in the proposals submitted to the WPDR. Their growing involvement will greatly enhance the quality and enforceability of the fi nal text.
Another services-inherent concern that may protract negotiations or affect their outcome is the absence of international standards. International standards could constitute a yardstick against which the necessity of a given measure could be tested. Arguably, an abundance of international standards would allow the introduction of a TBT/SPS-like rebuttable presumption of necessity for those measures that conform to these standards. 163 Theoretically, such a presumption would facilitate the task of the adjudicating bodies by making their judgments more informed and objective. In practice, however, the manner in which some of the standard-setting bodies operate makes this assumption problematic. Experience shows that there have been standards that benefi t from the TBT/SPS-like presumption and which have not been adopted by consensus. Sometimes, they do not even refl ect the views of the majority in the standard-setting body. 164 Another issue is that it may be erroneous to allow voluntary standards to benefi t from this presumption because it distorts preferences and, in the long run, transforms such standards into de facto mandatory ones, as countries are willing to adopt them in order to avoid litigation. This could even lead to a race to the bottom in the case of countries that had initially opted for a higher level of protection. For these reasons, the question whether the absence of international standards may have a negative infl uence on the effectiveness of a horizontal necessity test cannot be answered straightforwardly.
As regards the political concerns, one could fi rst refer to the leeway that the adjudicating bodies should be allowed when interpreting the suggested necessity test. Based on the earlier analysis of the proposals, one can infer that guidance to the WTO judiciary on how it should construe numerous concepts, such as necessity, burdensomeness, trade-restrictiveness, professional competence, or quality of the service, is insignifi cant. This could mean that Members feel comfortable with the interpretations that the adjudicating bodies advanced when dealing with similar concepts in other WTO Agreements. Alternatively, this might imply that Members could not be more specifi c without jeopardizing the effectiveness of a necessity test destined to apply horizontally. Or, perhaps, that Members could not agree on more specifi c provisions, for instance on a provision similar to footnote 3 to Article 5(6) SPS, and hence this was the only way in which to avoid the deadlock and, a fortiori , the incremental transaction costs.
Nonetheless, the most important challenge that the proponents of a necessity test for services face is to reassure those Members that oppose the adoption of a horizontal necessity test on the ground that it curtails their fl exibility in regulating domestic services industries. Indeed, such a test has been anathema to several Members and NGOs. The fear of an abstract loss of regulatory sovereignty appears time and again and delays the adoption of meaningful disciplines. This occurs despite the numerous assurances in Members ' proposals or during the WPDR discussions that Members ' right to regulate, including the right to introduce or to maintain regulations that aim to ensure the fulfi lment of national policy objectives, and to adopt certain regulatory approaches or regulatory provisions cannot be limited by the necessity test in any way. 165 After all, similar necessity tests are also present in other WTO Agreements, and the experience from the case law demonstrates that this right has been adequately preserved. 163 Even with the current scarcity of international standards in services, there are RIAs that introduce a similar presumption. A necessity test is crucial for effective and operationally useful disciplines under Article VI(4). This view is notably corroborated by the proposal submitted by Australia et al. Necessity tests are envisaged for all categories of measures, simply because a criterion or benchmark is needed against which the future disciplines should be judged. This is true wherever a necessity test exists. In other words, some kind of necessity test will inevitably be part of the fi nal outcome of the WPDR negotiations. 166 Therefore, it is in the interests of the Members to clarify the content of a prospective horizontal necessity test rather than entrust the interpretation of ambiguous wording to the WTO judiciary and its judicial creativity.
To allay the worries that are expressed by developing countries or LDCs, Members could allow for derogations that would apply to the developing country Members for a certain period. An additional safeguard in this respect is the decision to apply the future disciplines only to committed sectors. Hence, when a Member decides to liberalize a sector, it should be aware that this sector is also covered by a necessity test for those measures that relate to licensing, qualifi cations, or technical standards. While the wording of Article VI(4) seems to call for an application of the prospective disciplines regardless of commitments made, the conditional application of a horizontal necessity test may be a crucial element for its political acceptance.
Of course, developed countries may also oppose a necessity test. Discussions in the WPDR have, for instance, revealed the considerable reluctance of the United States ' government, and of its powerful domestic regulatory agencies, to contemplate the adoption of a necessity test under the GATS that might subject sovereign non-discriminatory regulatory conduct to a trade or market-access test. 167 This is somewhat paradoxical for a country with such a long tradition of applying cost -benefi t analysis in its domestic jurisdiction, the goods producers of which are already subject to a necessity test under TBT and SPS, and the services industry of which is the world's most internationalized, and hence the most likely to suffer from unduly burdensome regulatory conduct overseas. To date, the United States ' government has argued in favour of a strengthening of the GATS transparency disciplines rather than developing a horizontal necessity test, and has advanced proposals on such disciplines. 168 Nevertheless, the United States would not mind agreeing on a horizontal necessity test in the fi nal outcome of the WPDR negotiations on condition that its proposal for horizontal transparency disciplines fi nds acceptance among Members. From a public-interest point of view, a trade-off between necessity and transparency would appear a highly desirable solution for enhancing the GATS. Such a combination would arguably help to improve the quality of domestic rule-making in both substantive and procedural terms. Transparency, together with necessity, can indeed be expected to reduce the trade-restrictiveness and burdensomeness of regulatory measures by increasing accountability, predictability, and legal certainty, while also reducing protectionist bias, regulatory capture, and similar ' siren calls ' .
Finally, an important element that may affect the fi nal effectiveness of the future disciplines is their legal status. The most suitable option appears to be the creation of an Annex on Domestic Regulation, as fi rst proposed by Japan. By virtue of Article XXIX GATS, then, the disciplines would become an integral part of the GATS. Another option would be to create a reference paper. In this case, no consensus would be required, but Members would be requested to list the disciplines in the form of additional commitments in their schedules. Nevertheless, this option would involve request -offer-type negotiations. 
Conclusions
This article has discussed issues of legal interpretation, political realism, and intense bargaining associated with the fulfi lment of the Article VI(4) legal mandate. The creation of a horizontal necessity test is the nucleus of this mandate. Whereas necessity has made a long journey through the GATT/WTO history, it remains a highly controversial concept, and understandably so, as it touches upon regulatory sovereignty and questions its rationale vis-à-vis trade liberalization.
This article aspired to come to grips with theoretical and practical issues associated with the possible creation of a horizontal necessity test. It was pointed out that several interpretations made by the adjudicating bodies relating to the necessity tests embodied in other WTO Agreements or in RIAs (notably the proportionality test and its interpretation by the ECJ) can be helpful in clarifying similar notions under Article VI(4). Essential elements of any of the necessity tests set out in numerous WTO Agreements, such as the less/least trade-restrictiveness, balancing, means -ends test, and comparison between alternatives and reasonable availability, are not Agreement-specifi c.
Members should seek the creation of a horizontal necessity test that will build on these concepts and be fl exible enough to encompass several qualifi cations, thereby allaying Members ' worries as regards the preservation of their regulatory autonomy. For instance, Members should consider the de minimis requirement laid down in Article 5(6) SPS with respect to the possible alternative measures that could outlaw the measure at hand. Equally interesting for the WPDR negotiations could be the TBT language. However, a necessity test that covers measures having the effect of unnecessarily restricting trade has few chances of acceptance at a horizontal level. Such coverage can be accepted more easily at a sectoral level, as the accountancy disciplines demonstrated. In more general terms, qualifi cations that allow a margin of appreciation and room for manoeuvre to national regulatory authorities should form part of a prospective horizontal necessity test. Provisions that lay down transitional periods for the application of the necessity test to developing countries and LDCs depending on the level of development of their service sector are equally crucial for the overall acceptance of the future Article VI(4) disciplines.
The creation of a horizontal necessity test as part of the Article VI(4) prospective horizontal disciplines is both feasible and essential. Not only because, if no necessity test is created by the end of this Round, Members will not have fulfi lled the mandate prescribed in Article VI(4), but also because the absence of a necessity test would effectively render the new disciplines valueless, for no benchmark will be available to the WTO judiciary against which to judge the challenged measures. This would mean that several regulatory barriers that signifi cantly hinder trade in services will remain unaddressed. This would be in sharp contradiction to the approach adopted in Articles 2(2) TBT and 5(6) SPS. Arguably, it would also create a certain imbalance between Members ' stance vis-à-vis regulatory barriers in goods and those in services. Operational regulatory disciplines under Article VI(4) that embody a necessity test are in the interests of all Members. • The concept of proportionality, were it to be applied in a discipline, would have to relate to the type of measure at stake. It would also have to take account of the technical and economic context, including the level of development of a Member, the specifi c nature of the sector in which the measure is used, and also of the risks that non-fulfi lment would present.
• The fact that one Member imposes stricter rules than another Member does not mean that the former's rules are disproportionate. Measures taken by a member which set stricter requirements than international standards shall not, a priori , be considered disproportionate.
• 
